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May 2005
American health officials have raised the biosafety level of
A/H2N2 and are working with global health administrators to ensure that all
strains of the deadly influenza virus that had been shipped to laboratories
throughout the world are destroyed.
The so-called Asian influenza, which killed more than
1 million people in 1957, stopped circulating in 1968 and has not been included
in recent influenza vaccines. If the virus started circulating, anyone born
after 1968 would have little or no immunity to the virus.
According to Julie Gerberding, MD, director of the CDC, Meridian
Bioscience Inc. in Cincinnati, the laboratory that sent the virus, most likely
created test strips containing the A/H2N2 virus not inadvertently.
In a statement, Meridian officials said that they have a long
history of supplying influenza samples to the College of American Pathologists
(CAP) and they believe they were in compliance with all applicable
regulations.
![[bar]](../art/gradient.gif) What is the risk?
CAP sent the panels out to the laboratories, as part of
proficiency testing laboratories must undergo. CDC officials said they believe
CAP began shipping them out on Sept. 10, 2004. About 4,000 laboratories
received the panels; most were located in the United States, Gerberding said in
a press conference on April 13.
A Canadian laboratory had identified the A/H2N2 virus on March 26
and contacted its national health agency, which alerted WHO and the CDC that a
Canadian laboratory had identified the A/H2N2 virus on March 26.
Sixty-two of the laboratories were located in areas outside the
United States and Canada, including Bermuda, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, France,
Germany, Hong Kong, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and the United Kingdom. Gerberding said that no
reports of H2N2 infection have been reported anywhere. Influenza strain samples
around the country are tested and identified every year and unknown samples
which would include A/H2N2 are sent to the CDC. Gerberding said
no such samples have been sent to them.
WHO officials said the proper use of biological safety cabinets
and recommended personal protective equipment greatly reduces the risk of
laboratory-acquired influenza.
![[bar]](../art/gradient.gif) CAP reports
All of the laboratories that received the test panels were asked
to immediately destroy those containing the A/H2N2 virus, after a request by
the U.S. government. CAP further requested that destruction of the virus be
confirmed and that any case of respiratory disease among the laboratory workers
be investigated and reported to national authorities. WHO has a list of the
addresses of the laboratories that received the panels and has gotten in
contact with the Ministries of Health in all of the areas involved, according
to Gerberding.
Gerberding said that CAP reported to them that about 99.6% of the
samples have been destroyed as of April 21, and WHO reported that all of the
areas that were shipped the panels could account for them.
Klaus Stohr, MD, influenza chief at WHO, discussed the situation
during a press conference. Three laboratories in South Korea received samples
in 2004 and 2005, although the laboratories initially denied that they received
the shipment. According to Stohr, the shipping company has signatures from the
laboratories confirming that they received the panels, and WHO was still
investigating the matter. As of press time, another panel was unaccounted for
in Lebanon, although Stohr said that he was optimistic it would be tracked.
WHO originally believed that a panel was also missing in Mexico,
but Mexican authorities have found it. A safe destruction team is going to
Mexico City to destroy it.
The likelihood of infection is considered low when proper
biosafety precautions are followed, Stohr said. No cases of the influenza have
been reported anywhere, and, he added, the most dangerous time would have been
immediately after the panels had been shipped and the laboratories were unaware
of the situation.
![[bar]](../art/gradient.gif) Security implications?
A four-level system is used to describe the way a pathogen should
be handled. A/H2N2 was considered a Biosafety Level 2, which most influenza
viruses are considered in the United States. According to Gerberding, the CDC
and the NIH who jointly make the decisions regarding biosafety levels
were discussing elevating A/H2N2 to a Level 3 prior to this incident.
The review process was expedited and the CDC and the NIH determined that A/H2N2
would be treated as a Level 3, as it has been treated in areas outside the
United States.
W. Paul Glezen, MD, head epidemiologist and professor of
pediatrics and molecular virology and microbiology at the Baylor College of
Medicine in Houston, said Meridian Bioscience should be monitored and educated.
He added that the laboratories that perform the tests use good technique to
prevent accidents. Glezen said the virus should be completely sequenced so that
if any human cases do occur, similarity to the laboratory strain can be
checked.
According to Arnold Monto, MD, professor of epidemiology at the
University of Michigan School of Public Health in Ann Arbor, viruses lose
pathogenicity when shipped around the laboratory and, although the virus may
still be able to infect, it could have lost the ability to cause disease among
humans. Gerberding also discussed this possibility.
Monto said he believes that the Department of Homeland Security
does not need to get involved. The techniques to produce even more pathogenic
viruses exist, whether influenza A/H2N2 was put into the wrong hands or not,
Monto said.
Monto said he believes that it is not necessary to raise the
biosafety level of A/H2N2 to Level 3, although that is a judgment
call and debatable. According to Monto, laboratories contain
other threatening, non-influenza viruses in their freezers, and the CDC are
correct to examine safety measures.
The CDC has no regulatory authority over Meridian Biosciences and
other private companies.
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